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Abstract 
The central question of this research project was: how can we understand long term continuity 
and change in institutions and policies in Dutch coastal zone and river management, and which 
factors are relevant to understand the patterns of continuity and change observed? In our 
research, we focused in particular on the changing role of Rijkswaterstaat. We concluded that 
new ideas and discourses, which are disseminated by coalitions or epistemic communities, 
focusing events, focusing projects, and elections turn out to be relevant to understanding 
institutional dynamics. In adapting to the changing societal and political circumstances, 
Rijkswaterstaat found itself caught on the horns of a dilemma: between preserving its expert 
status on the one hand and developing into a more responsive and efficient public organisation 
on the other. 
 
i. Problem 
Dutch flood management institutions and policies display both continuity and interesting 
dynamics. On the one hand, Dutch water managers continue building and strengthening dikes 
and other flood defences to protect the Netherlands against sea and river floods. On the other 
hand, they recently have developed various new ‘soft-engineering’ alternatives, such as the 
creation of room for the river, for example by removing dikes, or by depoldering agricultural 
areas. To understand these developments, we focused particularly on the changing role and 
positioning of one of the most important organisations in the Dutch flood policy domain, 
namely the organisation of Rijkswaterstaat, the policy-implementing agency of the Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Rijkswaterstaat is generally known for its 
powerful position in the development of transport and hydraulic infrastructure in the 
Netherlands, for its engineering expertise, and for bringing the Dutch worldwide fame by 
realising major public projects, such as the Delta Works. 
 
ii. Aim 
The central objective of this research project was to describe the long term continuity and change 
in institutions and policies in the policy domain of coastal zone and river management in the 
Netherlands, with a particular focus on Rijkswaterstaat. In this way, we aimed to learn more 




In the following, we present a historical and chronological overview of the main developments 
within the Dutch flood policy domain, and within the organisation of Rijkswaterstaat, from circa 
1950 to the present. In this overview we touch upon various factors that are relevant to 
understanding the observed continuity and change in institutions and policies. These factors will 
be summarised in the conclusions.  
 
The technocratic paradigm 
The last dramatic sea flooding in the Netherlands took place on February the 1st, 1953, when 
more than 1800 people died. The Dutch Parliament reacted almost immediately in approving the 
so-called ‘Delta Plan’, which entailed the construction of a series of large dams to close the 
estuaries of the rivers Rhine, Scheldt and Meuse. The Delta Plan built on the plans that had 
already been developed by the ‘storm water committee’ before World War II (Meijerink, 2005). 
The basic idea of reducing flood probability by closing estuaries was not new either, since the 
Rijkswaterstaat engineers had constructed the Enclosure dam (‘Afsluitdijk’), and by that closed 
the ‘Zuyderzee’, in 1932. The period of the 1950s and 1960s was the era of the hegemony of the 
technocratic discourse, the era of modernity. There was a strong belief in the possibilities for 
solving water management issues by taking technical engineering measures, such as the 
construction of dams and dikes. The policy image of dams was positive since they were deemed 
necessary for protecting the Netherlands against sea floods. This image was shaped by an 
epistemic community of Delft civil engineers, who were employed at Rijkswaterstaat, 
consultancies, construction firms, and research institutes, such as Delft Hydraulics. Moreover, 
some members of this community held important positions in Parliament. This community was 
able to sustain the technocratic policy monopoly for decades. 
 
Waves of change, focusing projects and signs of disruption 
In the 1970s and 1980s the tide turned. Several far-reaching social and political trends in the 
western world, and in particular Dutch society, put the position of Rijkswaterstaat and that of the 
epistemic community of civil engineers under pressure. The organisation entered a crisis and 
became nicknamed a ‘state within the state’ – a slogan that suggested that it had the power to 
take decisions autonomously. 
First, in the early 1970s there was an explosive rise of the environmental movement (Tellegen, 
1978; Cramer, 1989), induced, among other things, by the publication of The Limits to Growth 
by the Club of Rome (Meadows, 1972). As a result, the nationwide support that the Delta Plan 
had received in the 1950s and 1960s started to diminish. Environmental interest groups were 
established and many large water management projects became defined as ‘environmental 
catastrophes’ instead of ‘major triumphs of civil engineering’ (Disco, 2002). The rise of the 
environmental movement was accompanied by a democratisation and emancipation of Dutch 
society, which was prompted by the student revolts of the 1960s. This second ‘wave of change’ 
(Schwartz, 1993) is also known as the ‘cultural revolution’ (Lintsen, 2005). Citizens wanted to 
have more voice in decision-making processes and rose in revolt against the ‘politics of expertise’ 
(Fischer, 1990). The oil crisis of 1973 marked the beginning of the third far-reaching social 
140
process that heavily influenced the position of Rijkswaterstaat. Unable to control the resulting 
economic crisis, from the 1980s the Dutch government started to reform its political-
administrative system. In line with the rise of the neoliberal politico-economic ideology in many 
western countries, budgets were cut drastically. Rijkswaterstaat, as one of the largest government 
organisations, had to contend with a fundamental reassessment of its formal position and the way 
in which it carried out its core tasks. 
For Rijkswaterstaat, the search for a new organisational identity was a road with many obstacles. 
While its responsibility for carrying out several important public tasks, such as the protection of 
the country against floods from the sea and the rivers, require technical knowledge and expertise 
on the Dutch water system, it was also being criticised for its technocratic working style. 
Rijkswaterstaat therefore found itself caught on the horns of a dilemma (Van den Brink, 2009): it 
needed its renowned expert status to fulfil its public responsibilities, whereas it needed to 
distance itself from this expert status to be able to meet the increasing social and political 
imperative of developing into a more responsive and effective public organisation. 
There were various ‘focusing projects’ (Lowry, 2006), clearly demonstrating the negative side-
effects of the prevailing technocratic water management paradigm, in this period. In particular 
the damming of the Eastern Scheldt estuary, the reclamation of the Markerwaard, the planned 
river dike improvements and the new A27 motorway through the Amelisweerd estate near 
Utrecht functioned as focusing projects (Meijerink, 2005; Van den Brink, 2009; Van den Brink 
and Wiering, 2009). Here, we focus on the controversy about the damming of the Eastern 
Scheldt estuary, the final large dam that was envisioned in the Delta Plan. Rijkswaterstaat was in 
favour of carrying out the original Delta Plan drawn up after the disastrous flood of 1953, which 
included a complete closure of this estuary. However, as the proposed fixed dam would eliminate 
the saltwater ecosystem and associated fisheries, it became the object of massive and persistent 
popular protests. Rijkswaterstaat was forced by the government to come up with alternative 
designs that were both safe and ecologically acceptable, and, if possible, technologically 
challenging (Leemans and Geers, 1983; Goverde, 1976; Disco, 2002). In 1974, with the help of 
dredging and construction companies, Rijkswaterstaat proposed to partly close the Eastern 
Scheldt estuary with a storm barrier caisson dam. In normal circumstances the caissons are open, 
to a large extent maintaining the tidal regime in the estuary, but they can be closed entirely during 
unusually high sea levels (Bijker, 2002). This innovative ecological design saved the day for 
Rijkswaterstaat.  
Rijkswaterstaat had already recognised the need for developing ecological knowledge in 1971. In 
this year a new Environmental Department was established within the Delta Department, and 
the first university educated biologist within Rijkswaterstaat, Henk Saeijs, was appointed head of 
this Section (Disco, 2002). Saeijs would attract more ecologists and biologists soon, thus 
contributing to the dissemination of ecological knowledge within Rijkswaterstaat. This new 
epistemic community started to build a knowledge-base on ecological issues, and contributed to 
the reframing of water and safety issues as multidisciplinary issues, including important ecological 
aspects. Saeijs, who later started working at the Ministry in The Hague, was one of the founding 
fathers of the concept of integrated water management, emphasising the need to include 




New shock events 
In 1993 and 1995 (near) river floods raised societal awareness of flood protection issues in the 
Netherlands, as well as awareness among river experts of the limits to controlling high water 
levels with higher dikes only. To be able to cope with potential flood disasters in the future, that 
is, to anticipate the projected impacts of climate change, sea level rise and increasing river 
discharges, Dutch water managers introduced new flood defence strategies. Building on the 
principle of integrated water management, the basic idea of the Room for the River safety 
strategy was to enlarge the discharge capacity of the Dutch main rivers by increasing the amount 
of space for the rivers (Wiering and Driessen, 2001). The aim of the National Spatial Planning 
Key Decision procedure was to develop a coherent river-widening plan for the Rhine river and 
its distributaries Waal, Nederrijn-Lek and IJssel. The initiating ministries were the Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management (the main initiator), the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality. The first and most important objective was to improve the flood security of the roughly 
four million inhabitants of the riverine area. The second objective was to improve the spatial 
quality of the river landscape (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat et al., 2002). Three types of 
river-widening measures were defined: spatial measures on the river side of the dike (e.g. 
excavating old river branches), spatial measures on the landward side of the dike (e.g. replacing 
dikes or the construction of a new river branch), and, only if necessary, technical measures (e.g. 
strengthening dikes or the removal of obstacles). 
The development and organisation of the National Spatial Planning Key Decision procedure has 
to be understood against the background of the increasing criticism of the technocratic culture 
and way of working of Rijkswaterstaat – the organisation was obliged to develop a more 
responsive attitude. The spatial nature of the Room for the River policy also called for a 
different, more democratic, way of working. As a result, river management became a political 
issue, instead of being simply and solely a technical issue (see also Van den Brink and Meijerink, 
2006). 
 
Towards a public-oriented government business 
The first way in which Rijkswaterstaat adapted to the changing circumstances, and tried to deal 
with the dilemma it faced between preserving its expert status and developing into a more 
responsive and efficient public organisation was by incorporating the new ecological perspective 
in its predominantly technocratic system of meaning. This development is generally referred to as 
the ‘ecological turn’ in the technocratic water management paradigm (1970s–1990s). Concepts 
such as ‘integrated water management’, ‘water system’ and ‘room for water’ were developed, and 
biologists and ecologists were hired to assess the ecological impacts of water management 
projects and to make the environment and the landscape key issues. 
In the same period, another turn took place in the technocratic paradigm, which would also 
greatly influence Dutch coastal zone and river management. The second way in which 
Rijkswaterstaat adapted to the changing circumstances was by embracing the new neoliberal 
politico-economic ideology. This development can be referred to as the ‘managerial turn’ (Van 
den Brink, 2009) in the technocratic water management paradigm. The period of the 1980s and 
1990s constituted the first phase of this turn. In line with New Public Management ideas – the 
‘tool’ to implement the neoliberal ideology (see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Kettl, 2000) – 
142
Rijkswaterstaat introduced various management tools from private business to improve its 
effectiveness and efficiency. In the early years of the 21st century, the managerial turn accelerated 
under the influence of new external events – such as the publication of the findings of the 
temporary committee for infrastructure projects (Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten, 
2004) – and the separation, imposed by Parliament, of policy making and policy implementation. 
By introducing a Business Plan (Rijkswaterstaat, 2004), Rijkswaterstaat actively tried to transform 
itself into a ‘public-oriented government business’ and sought to develop a new identity as a 
policy-implementing agency. For instance, a new business model was introduced consisting of 
three internal steering relationships with the ministry, a new working style was adopted with the 
introduction of ‘the market, unless’ principle, and several radical internal reorganisations were 
implemented to create ‘one Rijkswaterstaat’.  
Rijkswaterstaat thus managed to successfully embrace and incorporate elements and practices of 
the new environmental and neoliberal managerial discourses. Nevertheless, it is still caught on the 
horns of a dilemma in concrete water planning practices: between its expert status on the one 
hand and the need to democratise its way of working on the other. This is illustrated by the IJssel 
Delta South project in the upper riverine area for the construction of a bypass of the river IJssel. 
IJssel Delta South is an integrated planning project, for which not Rijkswaterstaat, but Overijssel 
Provincial Executive is the initiator. The Rijkswaterstaat employees involved had difficulty with 
realising their ambition to be the discussion partner of the region: they wanted to balance a 
reviewing role, i.e. seeing to it that the strict conditions set by Parliament were met, and a 
collaborative thinking role. Whereas the local and regional parties mainly identified with the 
democratic governance discourse to interpret and develop their partner roles, the Rijkswaterstaat 
employees mainly participated on the basis of their engineering knowledge and expertise, from a 
managerial control perspective. This was in line with the managerial turn in the technocratic 
water management paradigm. Although the local and regional parties valued the efforts made by 
the Rijkswaterstaat employees, they did not perceive Rijkswaterstaat as a real partner. There was 
more to being a partner than bringing in technical knowledge and expertise and reviewing the 
plans of the region. Parties were only considered real partners when they were able to negotiate 
and to make decisions. 
 
iv. Conclusions 
In sum, policy beliefs and discourses have changed fundamentally in the Dutch coastal and river 
flooding policy domain in the past decades. Though the policy community in the field of Dutch 
water management is still well organised at different administrative levels, the engineering 
community is no longer able to capture the flood policy domain on its own. The engineering 
paradigm is at least partly replaced by an ecological and a managerial paradigm. The influence of 
new ideas and new actors in this policy community has forced undoubtedly the epistemic 
community of civil engineers to reflect on its policies and to change its technocratic approach in 
accordance with demands of openness, transparency and legitimacy in policy-making under 
democratic conditions. 
Looking at the factors relevant to understanding continuity and change in the Dutch flood policy 
domain, we have seen that new ideas and discourses which are disseminated by coalitions or 
epistemic communities, focusing events, such as river flooding, focusing projects, such as the 
Eastern Scheldt storm surge barrier, and elections are all relevant to understanding institutional 
143
dynamics. The study also revealed how the organisation of Rijkswaterstaat has adapted to new 
societal demands and external pressures, and struggles with dilemmas, such as the dilemma 
between technocracy and democracy. To develop its positioning in integrated water planning 
projects, Rijkswaterstaat could reconsider its role of a technical expert in a democratic society. 
The challenge is to understand technical knowledge and expertise as part of the social context in 
which it is embedded and together with local and regional parties co-produce new plans. 
References 
Bijker, W.E. (2002). The Oosterschelde storm surge barrier: a test case for Dutch water technology, 
management, and politics. Technology and Culture 43(3):569-584. 
Cramer, J.M. (1989). De groene golf: geschiedenis en toekomst van de Nederlandse milieubeweging. Van 
Arkel, Utrecht. 
Disco, C. (2002). Remaking ‘nature’: the ecological turn in Dutch water management. Science, Technology 
and Human Values 27(2):206-235. 
Fischer, F. (1990). Technocracy and the politics of expertise. Sage, New York. 
Goverde, H. (1976). Oosterschelde: politiek en planning door leerling-watertovenaars? Plan 8:6-12. 
Kettl, D.F. (2000). The global public management revolution: a report on the transformation of 
governance. Brookings Institution, Washington DC. 
Leemans, A.F. & Geers, K. (1983). Doorbraak in het Oosterscheldebeleid. Coutinho, Muiderberg. 
Lintsen, H.W. (2005). Made in Holland: een techniekgeschiedenis van Nederland (1800-2000). Walburg 
Pers, Zutphen. 
Lowry, W. (2006). Potential Focusing Projects and Policy Change. Policy Studies Journal 34(3):313-335. 
Meadows, D.L. (1972). The limits to growth: a report for the Club of Rome’s project on the predicament 
of mankind. New York, Universe Books. 
Meijerink, S. (2005). Understanding policy stability and change: the interplay of advocacy coalitions and 
epistemic communities, windows of opportunity, and Dutch coastal flooding policy 1945-2003. 
Journal of European Public Policy 12(6):1060-1077. 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, Ministerie van VROM & Ministerie van LNV (2002). Startnotitie 
MER in het kader van de PKB-procedure Ruimte voor de Rivier. Den Haag. 
Osborne, D.E. & Gaebler, T.A. (1992). Reinventing government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is 
transforming the public sector. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. 
Rijkswaterstaat (2004). Ondernemingsplan. Een nieuw perspectief voor Rijkswaterstaat: doorpakken, wel 
degelijk. Den Haag. 
Saeijs, H.L.F., Smits A.J.M., Overmars, W. & Willems, D. (2004). Changing estuaries, changing views. 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Radboud University Nijmegen. 
Schwartz, P. (1993). De strategie van Rijkswaterstaat: leren bij strategische besluitvorming. Bestuurskunde 
2(1):34-41. 
Tellegen, E. (1978), Milieu en maatschappijverordening. In E. Tellegen & J. Willems, Milieuaktie in 
Nederland (pp. 160-178). De Trommel (Vereniging Milieudefensie), Amsterdam. 
Tijdelijke Commissie Infrastructuurprojecten (2004). Grote projecten uitvergroot: een infrastructuur voor 
besluitvorming. Sdu, Den Haag. 
144
Van den Brink, M. & Meijerink, S. (2006). Implementing policy innovations: resource dependence, 
struggle for discursive hegemony and institutional inertia in the Dutch river policy domain. GaP 
Working Paper Series 2006/2, Radboud University Nijmegen. 
Van den Brink, M. (2009). Rijkswaterstaat on the horns of a dilemma. Eburon, Delft. PhD thesis 
Radboud University Nijmegen. 
Van den Brink, M. & Wiering, M. (2009). Waterbeleid volgt calamiteit? Rooilijn 42(1):6-13. 
Wiering, M. & Driessen, P. (2001). Beyond the art of diking: interactive policy on river management in the 
Netherlands. Water Policy 3(4):283-296. 
